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Standard-essential patents in standard setting organizations: competition 
law and the realization of licensing commitments** 
 
I. Problem and Facts 
 
1. Fundamental Constellation 
The judgment handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union (hereinafter: 
CJEU) in Huawei Technologies concerns Art. 102 TFEU, i.e. the ban on abusing a dominant 
position in European competition law. Is a patent proprietor in breach of this provision when 
it sues an alleged patent infringer for injunctive relief, although the patent proprietor promised 
a licence and although the alleged infringer declared itself willing to enter into a licensing 
agreement? This general question typically arises in the following guise where standardisation 
is concerned: When developing technical standards within the context of recognized Standard 
Setting Organizations (e.g. in Europe CEN,CENELEC and the ETSI relevant in the present 
context1), nowadays the participating enterprises are normally urged to issue a FRAND 
declaration, namely to commit to licensing pertinent intellectual property rights to all 
interested parties at fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms.2 The aim is to avoid 
standardisation participants enticing the relevant industry into a patent ambush in which the 
relevant industrial property rights are initially concealed before being disclosed following 
acceptance of the standard, in order to demand excessive licence fees.3 
 
2. Complications 
The FRAND commitment practice has in fact defused the problem of opportunistic behaviour 
within standardisation institutes. Spectacular cases of ambushing such as Rambus4 have 
remained the exception. However, problematic consequences have arisen: Since “FRAND” is 
an undefined term and no particular effort has been made to specify it in further detail, dispute 
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 FRAND: Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory, see in detail Weber, 34 World Competition 51 (2011). The 
standards-related FRAND declaration has to be distinguished from the declaration of willingness to license 
under patent law in accordance with Sec. 23 of the German Patent Act (PatG) and Art. 8 of the EU Regulation on 
Unitary Patent Protection (Regulation (EU) No. 1257/2012): FRAND declarations are issued within the context 
of standardisation institutes, the declaration of willing to license under patent law is made to the Patent Office. 
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3
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4
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arises frequently about the amount of a reasonable licence fee and about the reasonableness of 
the other terms.5 As long as no licence agreement has been brought about, the proprietor of 
intellectual property rights is likely to sue enterprises already using the protected subject-
matter for infringement. However, many of the relevant intellectual property rights constitute 
“essential standards”: It is not possible to manufacture products in line with the standards 
without using the relevant patent. Vertically integrated intellectual property right holders 
active on downstream markets that depend on the standard could therefore be tempted to 
refuse or delay the conclusion of licensing agreements. 
 
3. Factual Constellation 
The Regional Court (LG) Düsseldorf has to decide a corresponding dispute between two 
Chinese enterprises from Shenzhen. The focus lies on the LTE standard, i.e. the standard for 
fourth-generation mobile phone systems. More than 4,700 patents have been registered as 
standard-essential patents (SEPs) for the LTE standard. A FRAND declaration was issued to 
ETSI for the patent in dispute by Huawei Technologies (hereinafter: Huawei). ZTE produces 
base stations using LTE software, meaning that is uses all LTE-essential patents. Licensing 
negotiations between the two parties were unsuccessful. ZTE filed an opposition against the 
patent in dispute at the European Patent Office. Huawei sued ZTE for injunctive relief, 
presentation of accounts, recall of the product and damages. The Regional Court (LG) 
referred several questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling (Art. 267 TFEU), concerning 
the pivotal question whether, and if so subject to which requirements, a patent infringement 
action is to be considered abuse of a dominant market position in the sense of Art. 102 TFEU 
where a FRAND declaration was issued.6 
 
II. Solution Developed by CJEU: Roadmap for FRAND Cases 
 
1. Negatory and Compensatory Protection 
When applying these principles the CJEU distinguishes between actions for injunctive relief 
and recall of a product on the one hand, and actions for the presentation of accounts and 
damages on the other hand. The CJEU held that the latter actions are not in breach of Art. 102 
TFEU since the assertion of a claim for presentation of accounts and damages for past acts of 
use does not directly affect whether products of competitors that comply with the standards 
are put or remain on the market.7 
 
2. Exceptional Circumstances 
As regards actions for injunctive relief and recall of the product, the CJEU referred to its 
established case law, according to which “the exercise of an exclusive right linked to an 
intellectual-property right by the proprietor may, in exceptional circumstances, involve 
abusive conduct for the purposes of Article 102 TFEU”.8 In the present case the CJEU 
                                                 
5
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6
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7
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affirmed the existence of exceptional circumstances, arguing as follows: Patents do not 
“normally” prevent third parties from manufacturing competing products since they can 
diverge from the patent “without compromising the essential functions of the product in 
question”.9 Where standard-essential products are concerned the situation changes since 
products conforming to the standard can only be manufactured using the relevant patent. 
Hence the proprietor of the intellectual property rights can deploy a claim for injunctive relief 
in order to “prevent products manufactured by competitors from appearing or remaining on 
the market and, thereby, reserve to itself the manufacture of the products in question.”10 This 
is contrary to the typical quid pro quo of the case: An SEP can only be obtained against an 
irrevocable declaration of willingness to license at FRAND terms. Moreover, a FRAND 
declaration generates legitimate expectations in third parties. 
 
3. Requirements Made of Claim for Injunctive Relief 
The CJEU therefore held that “the abusive nature of such a refusal may, in principle, be raised 
in defence” to actions for injunctive relief or for the recall of products.11 However, since 
licences only have to be granted at FRAND terms, “a fair balance between the interests 
concerned” has to be established. When establishing such a balance the CJEU largely 
concurred with the final opinion of the Advocate General,12 while favouring the patent 
proprietor on several points. The patent proprietor has to observe certain requirements so that 
an action for injunctive relief and the recall of products will not be considered abusive.13 Prior 
to bringing the action the patent proprietor has to point out the patent infringement, has to 
indicate the patent concerned and specify the nature of the alleged infringement. If the alleged 
patent infringer has expressed his willingness to enter into a licensing agreement at FRAND 
terms, the patent proprietor has to submit a specific, written offer to license and, in particular, 
has to indicate the licence fee and how it will be calculated.14 
 
The alleged patent infringer has to respond diligently to the offer and observe principles of 
good faith. Hence, where he does not accept the offer, the alleged infringer has to submit a 
specific counter-offer in line with FRAND terms at short notice. From the point at which his 
counter-offer is rejected, the alleged infringer already using the patent has to provide 
appropriate security, e.g. by providing a bank guarantee or by placing the amounts necessary 
on deposit.15 Precise calculations are required about use of the SEP. If the conduct of the 
alleged patent infringer is not in line with these requirements or delaying tactics are 
employed, the accusation of abuse against the patent proprietor will be dropped. 
 
                                                 
9
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 The Advocate General had assumed an obligation to provide security only after an application for a decision 
by a court or an arbitration tribunal had been made, see AG Wathelet – Huawei, para. 93. 
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The further specification and application of these requirements to the case at hand is the 
responsibility of the court referring the questions for a preliminary ruling. The CJEU also 
pointed out that the parties have the option of agreeing on an independent third party who 
determines details of the FRAND terms. Furthermore, an alleged infringer “cannot be 
criticised” for challenging the validity or the essential nature of the patent to the relevant 
standard and/or its actual use, or for reserving the right to do so in future: Standardisation 
institutes do not examine the validity of the relevant patents or the question whether they are 
in fact essential to the standard in which they are included.16 
 
4. Conclusion 
The CJEU has developed a FRAND-specific roadmap guiding the proprietor of an SEP past 
the prohibition of Art. 102 TFEU and chaperoning potential licensees towards use of the 
standard under a licensing agreement. If the patent proprietor disregards the guidelines, he 
will be in breach of competition law; if the party using the patent ignores the plan, a claim for 
injunctive relief under patent law will prevail. 
 
III. Position Among Existing Cases 
For the first time the CJEU handed down a ruling on the conformity with competition law of 
patent infringement actions following a commitment to license at FRAND terms. However, 
other courts and several cartel authorities have already addressed the issue. 
 
1. Compulsory Licence Under Competition Law 
In the Huawei case, the obligation of the patent proprietor to enter into a licensing agreement 
follows from its own FRAND commitment.17 Hence this does not involve a compulsory 
licence, but, rather, the fulfilment of a private, autonomous commitment assumed. The 
contrasting case is that of a compulsory licence under competition law, where refusal to grant 
a licence is considered a violation of competition law and where freedom to contract is 
restricted under exceptional circumstances. Where a compulsory licence under competition 
law is concerned, the abuse therefore arises in the refusal to grant a licence. In FRAND cases, 
in contrast, the assertion of a claim for injunctive relief despite a declaration of willingness to 
license is considered to constitute abuse.18 
 
As regards the requirements of a compulsory licence under competition law, orientation was 
provided by the CJEU in the Magill19 and IMS Health20 cases. The German Federal Court of 
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 CJEU– Huawei, para. 68-69. 
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 In accordance with the prevailing opinion, FRAND commitments should be considered binding under civil 
law, e.g. as a contract for the benefit of a third party or as an offer ad incertas personas. According to opposing 
views, however, a mere pactum de negotiando, a pactum de non petendo or even invitatio ad offerendum are 
assumed; see references in Körber, Standardessentielle Patente, FRAND-Verpflichtungen und Kartellrecht, 
2013, 38 et seq.; Maaßen, Normung, Standardisierung und Immaterialgüterrechte, 2006, 317 et seq.; Tapia, 
Industrial Property Rights, Technical Standards and Licensing Practices (FRAND) in the Telecommunications 
Industry, 2010, 18 et seq. 
18
 See also Picht, GRUR Int 2014, 1 (11-12), who classifies the subsequent refusal to grant a licence despite a 
FRAND commitment to be exclusionary abuse in the sense of Art. 102 TFEU; the CJEU was not asked to 
express an opinion on this question. 
19
 CJEU, GRUR Int 1995, 490 – Magill TV Guide. 
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 CJEU, GRUR 2004, 524 – IMS Health. Also important: judgment of the Court of First Instance (Grand 
Chamber), ECLI:EU:T:2007:289 – Microsoft v Commission. Regarding the unresolved issues see 
5 
 
Justice (BGH) clarified that the defence of a compulsory licence under competition law can 
be raised directly in infringement proceedings.21 Yet according to the Orange Book Standard 
judgment, this applies to a claim for injunctive relief only if the user makes an unconditional 
offer for the conclusion of a licensing agreement and pays or deposits the prospective licence 
fees. An offer will only be considered unconditional provided the user does not challenge the 
validity of the intellectual property right and does not deny the infringement.22 
 
Although the Orange Book Standard judgment did not concern a FRAND commitment, but a 
compulsory licence under competition law relating to a de facto standard, the judgment did 
exercise a considerable influence on the discussion concerning FRAND cases. The strict 
requirements of the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) contradict the approach adopted 
by the European Commission to solving the problem - which will be discussed below. The 
conflict between the two concepts is of pivotal significance to the decision of the Regional 
Court (LG) Düsseldorf to refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in the Huawei 
case.23 
 
2. FRAND Commitment 
 
a) Horizontal Guidelines of the European Commission 
In its Horizontal Guidelines dating from 2010 the European Commission defined a safe 
harbour for standardisation agreements. According to the Horizontal Guidelines, there is no 
restriction of competition in the sense of Art. 101(1) TFEU where participation in the setting 
of standards is unrestricted and transparent, where standardisation agreements contain no 
obligation to comply with the standard and provide access to the standard on fair, reasonable 
and non-discriminatory terms while containing an IPR policy for the disclosure of pertinent 
intellectual property rights in good faith.24 Failure to observe these requirements does not 
automatically mean that the relevant standardisation agreements are in breach of competition 
law. Rather, examination of the individual case at hand is required. 
 
b) Motorola Mobility and Samsung 
In the Motorola Mobility case the European Commission held that a request made for 
injunctive relief under patent law despite a FRAND commitment was to be considered abuse 
of a dominant position on the market if the user is willing to enter into a licensing 
agreement.25 However, no fine was imposed: the Commission held that so far there was no 
case law from the EU courts and that the courts in the Member States had reached different 
conclusions so far.26 A restriction of competition was also held to arise where the opponent 
                                                                                                                                                        
Ullrich/Heinemann in Immenga/Mestmäcker (Eds.), Wettbewerbsrecht, Vol. 1. EU/Part 2, 5th ed. 2012, GRUR 
B, No. 58 et seq. 
21
 German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), GRUR 2004, 966 (970) – Standard-Spundfass (regarding the claim 
for damages). 
22
 German Federal Court of Justice (BGH), GRUR 2009, 694 – Orange-Book-Standard. 
23
 See decision of Regional Court (LG) Düsseldorf, GRUR-RR 2013, 196 (197-198) – Huawei Technologies. 
24
 European Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements dated 14.12.2010, OJ 2011 C 11/1, para. 277 et seq. 
25
 European Commission, OJ 2014 C 344/6 – Motorola (summary). 
26
 Ibid., para. 25. 
6 
 
was prevented from challenging the validity of the relevant intellectual property rights or from 
raising the defence of non-infringement. 
 
The Samsung proceedings were concluded on the basis of the same line of arguments by way 
of commitments assumed in accordance with Art. 9 of Regulation No. 1/2003.27 In this case, 
the European Commission has developed a safe harbour for potential licensees. It definitely 
assumes a genuine interest of the user in concluding a licensing agreement if a maximum 
period of 12 months is set for the duration of the licence negotiations and if the parties accept 
that the terms will be determined by a court or – upon mutual agreement - by an arbitration 
tribunal, should those negotiations fail.28 
 
3. Conclusion 
The Huawei judgment of the CJEU (indirectly) confirms the previous practice of the 
European Commission. In order to avoid an accusation of abuse of a dominant position on the 
market, the proprietor of an SEP has to present an offer at FRAND terms to interested parties. 
It is not the potential licensee’s responsibility to make an offer. The CJEU provides specific 
guidelines as to the procedure to be adopted where agreement cannot be reached on the 
reasonable nature of contractual terms. 
 
The negative wording of the answer to the questions referred is conspicuous: Although the 
Court assumes that actions for injunctive relief and recall of a product against users who are 
willing to license are in principle abusive in FRAND cases,29 it denies the existence of abuse 
where a number of (positively worded) requirements are met. In contrast, the Advocate 
General proposed that abuse be affirmed where certain (negatively worded) requirements are 
met. A comparison of the answers reveals that the Court placed considerable emphasis on the 
finding that actions for patent infringement are not in breach of Art. 102 TFEU provided 
certain requirements are met. 
 
IV. Assessment 
The judgment handed down by the CJEU demonstrates the effort made to establish a fair 
balance between patent law and competition law.30 Indeed, the FRAND cases present a (new) 
paradigm for the (old) conflict between these two areas of law.31 In the past, attempts were 
made to resolve the tension by way of delimitation provisions. According to the theory of the 
specific subject-matter, competition law was not to be applicable to conduct covered by the 
specific subject-matter of the intellectual property right. This would be relevant in the present 
case: According to established case law, the specific subject-matter of a patent includes “the 
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 European Commission, OJ 2014 C 350/8 – Samsung (summary). 
28
 Ibid., para. 15 et seq. 
29
 CJEU – Huawei, para. 54. 
30
 See, for example, CJEU – Huawei, para. 42: “[T]he Court must strike a balance between maintaining free 
competition [...] and the requirement to safeguard that proprietor’s intellectual property rights and its right to 
effective judicial protection”. 
31
 See the fundamental studies by Appl, Technische Standardisierung und Geistiges Eigentum, 2012; Körber 
(supra note 17); Picht, Strategisches Verhalten bei der Nutzung von Patenten in Standardisierungsverfahren aus 
der Sicht des europäischen Kartellrechts, 2013. 
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right to oppose infringements”.32 However, the term “specific subject-matter” is not 
mentioned in the Huawei judgment. Instead, the arguments are based on the overall context. 
The fact that no preferential rules were applied (whether in favour of patent law or of 
competition law) is to be welcomed since this enables the establishment of a fair balance 
between both areas of law.33 
 
The depiction of the typical overall situation is also appropriate. The FRAND cases do not 
just concern individual technical achievements, but, rather, the collective setting of standards 
within standardisation institutes, which leads to the joint configuration of fundamental 
product qualities by competitors. As shown by glancing at the IP policy of the standardisation 
institute responsible in the present case,34 a “normal” patent becomes an SEP within the 
context of a reciprocal transaction: An SEP can only be obtained against an assurance of 
willingness to license at FRAND terms.35 If there is no willingness to license, an alternative 
will be sought, i.e. a standard developed which does not require the relevant patent. The deal 
is thwarted if the patent proprietor assumes an undertaking to grant licences but fails to fulfil 
it. On the other hand, a user of a patent who merely pretends to be interested in obtaining a 
licence without any serious interest in it, does not become a victim of abuse. 
 
Before this backdrop, the fact that the Court imposed an obligation on the patent proprietor, 
and not on the potential licensee, to submit a specific offer to license at FRAND terms, is 
convincing. This is in line not only with customary practice in the industry, but also creates a 
better balance between the negotiating positions of both parties. Furthermore, the patent 
proprietor can best judge whether his offer corresponds to the terms he proposed to third 
parties, which is important owing to the ban on discrimination imposed on him under the 
FRAND commitment (and Art. 102(2)(c) TFEU).36 What also speaks in favour of the Huawei 
judgment is the best possible innovation incentives it enables for all participants: The patent 
proprietor receives royalties for his invention that are in line with the terms he promised. 
Other market participants are not prevented from implementing the standard or from 
developing follow-up innovations in which they invest while relying on reasonable access to 
the standard. It is important to prevent the users of patents from merely pretending to be 
interested in concluding licensing agreements. However, this risk can be alleviated by detailed 
requirements made of the prospective licensee’s genuine interest. 
 
V. Outlook 
Within the scope of application of FRAND commitments, competition law can lead to a 
restriction of protection to compensatory claims, i.e. can exclude injunctive relief. 
Competition law is used to obtain a result that follows in common law from general principles 
of equity.37 However, the solution based on competition law is based on Art. 102 TFEU so 
that from the outset it is limited to enterprises occupying a dominant position on the market. 
                                                 
32
 See, e.g., CJEU, ECLI:EU:C:1992:73 para. 17 – Commission v Italy. 
33
 See on outdated fundamental concepts as applied to SEPs Heinemann, MR-Int 2014, 85 (91-92). 
34
 See supra note. 3. 
35
 According to the analysis in CJEU – Huawei, para. 51. 
36
 See CJEU – Huawei, para. 64. 
37
 Regarding the possibility of transposing the US four-factor test into EU law see Ohly, FS Ullrich, 2009, 257. 
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The judgment only directly affects SEPs within standardisation institutes, but it will also have 
other implications. 
 
1. Consequences in Practice 
In order to avoid a violation of competition law, proprietors of SEPs would be well-advised to 
follow the roadmap provided by the CJEU, i.e. to avoid rash injunctive relief and to first make 
a specific offer to license. Users of the standard have to participate constructively. Damages 
for the past use of an IP right can be demanded by a patent proprietor without conflict with 
competition law arising. 
 
The Huawei judgment only relates to cases where the proprietor of an SEP has made a 
commitment to license at FRAND terms. However, it can be transposed to constellations 
involving compulsory licensing under competition law since the prospective licensee who 
becomes a victim of an anti-competitive refusal to license may not be placed in a position 
worse than someone in relation to whom a promise to license is not kept. The model 
developed by the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) in the Orange Book Standard 
decision, which turns on an unconditional offer made by the potential licensee, therefore has 
to be replaced by a concept requiring the proprietor of IP rights to make an offer at reasonable 
terms.38 Nor may users be deprived of the fundamental legal remedies, namely the possibility 
of challenging the validity of a patent or of denying its status as an SEP or its use. 
 
2. Unresolved Questions 
 
a) Dominant Position on the Market 
The CJEU did not have to address the question of the circumstances in which the proprietor of 
an SEP occupies a dominant position on the market, which is fundamental to Art. 102 
TFEU.39 In a comment the Advocate General stated that an SEP did not necessarily lead to an 
assumption of a dominant position on the market. While considering necessary to examine 
each individual case he admitted that an SEP does permit a (rebuttable) presumption that there 
is a dominant position on the market.40 In corresponding cases, therefore, the relevant markets 
have to be carefully defined in order to then address the question of a dominant position.41 If 
there are viable alternatives to the relevant standard, the patent proprietor’s scope for 
manoeuvre is limited. 
 
b) Genuine Willingness to Obtain a Licence 
The ambit of protection against injunctive relief only covers those who genuinely seek to 
enter into a licensing agreement. One of the challenges in practice is, therefore, to identify 
genuine willingness to obtain a licence. The CJEU established several criteria, for example 
the obligation to make a written counter-offer within a short period of time. In a specific case, 
however, this will often not provide sufficient security. In this context the safe harbour 
                                                 
38
 Cf. Ullrich/Heinemann in Immenga/Mestmäcker (supra note 20), GRUR B, No. 62. 
39
 The CJEU pointed out that the existence of a dominant position on the market was undisputed in the case at 
hand, see CJEU – Huawei, paras. 28, 43. 
40
 AG Wathelet – Huawei, para. 57-58. 
41
 Cf. on the relevant issues Früh, Immaterialgüterrechte und der relevante Markt, 2012. 
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developed by the European Commission in the Samsung case therefore appears to provide 
assistance.42 It appears to be supported by the reference made by the CJEU, that the parties 
are able to agree on resolution of the dispute by an independent third party by way of 
arbitration.43 
 
c) Specification of FRAND Terms 
This leads us to the core issue, namely the substance of the FRAND terms. The 
standardisation institutes failed to specify this vague term in sufficient detail.44 In some cases 
it would be possible to avoid disputes under competition law by way of more clear-cut 
requirements.45 The standard setting organizations should therefore define the substance of 
FRAND terms in more detail and establish appropriate procedures to this end.46 Admittedly, 
conflicts of interest do arise, but they can be regulated. It does not seem logical to want to 
resolve the ambushing problem on the basis of FRAND commitments without regulating 
further details. Moreover, the work performed by the standardisation institutes is not intended 
to replace the responsibility of the cartel authorities, but, rather, to reduce the number of cases 
relevant under competition law. 
 
3. Final Remarks 
The Huawei judgment handed down by the CJEU provides new guidance for the relationship 
between intellectual property law and competition law. It clarifies that a solution conducive to 
innovation cannot be achieved by protecting intellectual property rights against competition 
law, but, rather, only by embracing the complementary nature of both areas of law. The 
judgment will exercise a strong influence on how SEPs are handled although it only directly 
concerns the unilateral behaviour of enterprises occupying a dominant position on the market. 
The right direction has been indicated; however, the roadmap developed by the CJEU is 
relatively vague on details. When cases are addressed in practice, numerous individual 
questions will arise that will have to be resolved by the parties, by standardisation 
organizations, arbitration tribunals and the courts as well as the competition authorities. 
                                                 
42
 See supra in front of note 28. 
43
 CJEU – Huawei, para. 68. However, on this point the Court did not go as far as the Advocate General, who 
proposed that the conduct of an alleged patent infringer should not be considered to be reluctant or lacking 
genuine willingness if he request that the FRAND terms be determined by a court or an arbitration tribunal (AG 
Wathelet – Huawei, paras. 93 and 103, point 4). 
44
 Stated expressly by the CJEU – Huawei, para. 20. 
45
 Cf. AG Wathelet – Huawei, para. 11. 
46
 A stronger involvement of the standardisation institutes with regard to FRAND was advocated by, e.g., 
Kühn/Scott Morton/Shelanski, CPI Antitrust Chronicle March 2013 (Special Issue); Picht (supra note 31), 543 et 
seq.; Tapia (supra note 17), 149 et seq. 
